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MARQUETTE LAIF REVIEI"l
EFFECT OF STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENTS ON
DEATH TAX VALUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The queston of whether certain types of restrictive agreements
concerning corporate stock controls the value of the stock for death
tax purposes has received conflicting answers from the courts.1 There
are three common types of agreements normally used by stockholders
to restrict the sale of a stipulated amount of their stock upon their
death to certain individuals at a given price. These three types are
commonly referred to as buy and sell, option, and restrictive sale agree-
ments. 2
Mutual buy and sell agreements are those whereby a corporation
or individual promises to buy, and the stockholder promises to sell
his shares at a specified price upon the happening of a certain contin-
gency, usually the stockholder's death. It is of the essence of such an
agreement that prior to the happening of the contingency, the stockhold-
er will not sell the shares and upon the occurrence of such contingency,
the buyer is bound to purchase the stocks.
Options to purchase stock at a stated price are similar to buy and
sell agreements in that the stockholder agrees not to sell his stock
prior to the happening of the contingency, or at least promises to first
offer it to the optionee at the stipulated price. Upon the happening of
the contingency, the stock must be first offered for sale to the optionee
at the stipulated price. Such options differ from a buy and sell agree-
ment in that the optionee is not bound to purchase at the stipulated
price at all unless he so desires.
Under the third classification, the restrictive sale agreement, the
stockholder agrees that if the stock will be sold during his lifetime
or after his death it will first be offered to the other contracting party
at an agreed price. This type of agreement differs from the other
two types because of the possibility that neither the stockholder nor
his estate may ever desire to sell the stock, and therefore the stock
would pass by testamentary or intestate transfer. The stockholder is
not bound to sell to the other party to the agreement at his death. The
courts for purposes of federal estate taxes refuse to be bound to the
price agreed upon in such agreements in determining valuation, but the
courts have considered the depressing effect of such restrictive agree-
ments and weighed them along with other factors in determining val-
uation.3 The state courts for inheritance tax purposes, are in this mat-
ter of restrictive sales agreements, in accord with federal decisions
I In Re Cowles' Estates, 36 Wasb. 2d 710, 219 P. 2d 964 (1950).
2 CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Report 1820 B (1954).
3 Worchester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 578 (1940).
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that such agreements are merely a consideration in determination of
stock valuation at death.4
The courts have split, however, on whether the first two classifica-
tions, the mutual buy and sell agreement and the options to purchase
agreements, should establish the value of the stock for death tax pur-
poses when such agreements are for the transfer of stock to take ef-
fect after the death of the shareholder at a stipulated price.
The federal estate tax calls for the adoption of the price fixed in
the mutual buy and sell agreements and in the options to purchase
agreements on the ground that the tax is primarily concerned with
the value of the property to the decedent's estate. The tax is measured
by the value of the estate to the decedent and is an exercise levied on the
transfer of the property from the dead to the living.
Most of the states, on the other hand, levy an inheritance tax on
what is received by the heirs, legatees, and distributees. The tax is
computed upon the value of the property passing to such individuals
and the tax upon such transfers is deducted by the executor before he
passes the property on.
It is normally contended that these two different types of death
taxes are the underlying reason for the two conflicting solutions ar-
rived at by the courts in their attempt to solve the problem of whether
a mutual buy and sell agreement and the option to purchcase agree-
ment, when entered into for the purpose of transfering stock to take
effect after death, should establish the value of the stock for death
tax purposes. The two conflicting solutions have in the past been com-
monly and conveniently designated the Federal Rule and the Pennsyl-
vania Rule.
II. THE FEDERAL RULE
The federal rule, according to numerous federal decisions,S holds
that the contract price controls where there is an irrevocable agree-
ment to buy and sell in absence of some evidence of an attempt at tax
evasion (or in other words some evidence that at arms length trans-
action has not taken place). Two leading cases, both decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the second circuit, Wilson v. Bow-
ers,6 and Lomb. v. Sugden,7 established that the existence at date of
4 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 305 Mass. 460, 26 N. E. 2d
305 (1940): Involving the identical "first offer restriction" as the federal es-
tate case, supra, note 3.
5 The leading case enunciating the federal rule is Helvering v. Salvage, 297
U.S. 106, 56 S. Ct. 375, 80 L.Ed 511 (1936), which held that a restriction on
a sale to $100 per share limited the value to that amount.
6 57 F. 2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932). The court here established that an option contract
giving shareholders the right to purchase stock at a specific price upon any
intended disposal by the owner at his death limited the value of the stock for
estate tax purpose to the option price. The court reasoned that since the con-
tract was specifically enforceable, the decedent, during his life could not have
sold the stock for more than the low price-at which he was obliged to offer
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death of a valid enforceable option, exercise of which would compel
the executor to sell the shares at the stipulated price, fixes their value
for federal estate tax purposes at the option price.
The Worcester County Trust Company8 case limited the scope of
the federal rule by excluding mere first offer restrictions during life
with no restriction at all on testamentary or intestate transfers (re-
strictive sale agreements), as controlling the valuation, but the case did
state that these agreements may serve to reduce the value for estate
tax purposes.
The reverse situation, where the stockholder is free to dispose of
his shares during his life and the option or mutual buy and sell con-
tract is not to become effective until the shareholder's death, was de-
cided in Estate of James H. Matthews9 where the court held that such
agreements do not limit the valuation of the stock for estate purposes to
the contract price.
The Lomb case supra, was affirmed in 1952 by the second circuit
in May v. McGowan.10 This is the case where the court made the classi-
cal statement:
"If they [Lomb and Wilson decisions] leave a loophole for
tax evasions in some cases, here the district court found that
there was no purpose to evade taxes. Such a loophole, if impor-
tant, should be closed by legislative action rather than by disre-
garding the cases we have cited."
Adequacy of the consideration under the federal rule must be
measured at the time of the transaction if the agreed price is bona fide
and reasonable.'
it and that at his death the option price was the most that the executor could
receive upon any sale.
782 F. 2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936). Here the shareholders's agreement provided that
in event of a proposed disposal of stock to an outsider, the stock was first
to be offered to other shareholders at a determinable price. If a shareholder
died without issue the other shareholders had an option to buy. Each share-
holder retained the right to give or bequeath her stock to another shareholder.
The decedent bequeathed her stock to her husband who also was a sharehold-
er. The price set by the restrictive agreement at the time of her death was
$69.44, while the fair market value determined by the commissioner was $100.
The court held that the value for estate tax purposes was $69.44 solely on
the grounds that decedents only choice was to give the stock away or sell it at
that price.
8 Supra, note 3.
93 T. C. 525; See Rev. Rule 54-77, 1954-1 Cum. Bull., 193-194.
LO 194 F. 2d 396 (2d Cir. 1950). In return for a son's personal guarantee to a
bank on a corporation debt, the son's option price of $100 for each share of
stock that his father owned at death was to be reduced by 1/500th of the then
outstanding debt. When the father died the debt was $90,000 and the son's
option price was zero. The court held that the father's interest in the corpor-
ation for estate tax purposes was also zero.
11 Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246, 253 (1937) ; Aff'd, 100 F. 2d 639 (3rd
Cir. 1938). In this case, the majority shareholder of a family corporation, in
order to retain the services of his son as an employee, placed his stock in a
trust by the terms of which the income was to be paid to the father for life.
At the father's death, the son became entitled under the terms of the trust
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III. THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE
The most recent Pennsylvania decision to apply the Pennsylvania
rule as originally laid down in the 1943 decision of McClure Appeal, 1
2
was Estate of Carrie E. Fidler.13 In the Fidler case, the decedent had
entered into an agreement with her son granting him an option to
purchase specific shares of stock at her death for a price of $100 per
share, but the court held that the $200 value set by the state appraisers
was the "clear value" taxable at decedent's death. The court concluded:
"Appellant contends that the court, in making its valuation,
should have been controlled by the option agreement and refers,
in support of the contention, to federal decisions dealing with
appraisements of property under the federal estate and gift tax
laws. The law requires an appraisement on the behalf of the
commonwealth. No agreement by a property owner fixing the
value can oust the jurisdiction of or control the commonwealth's
appraisers; such agreement does not create a limitation on the
value binding the commonwealth but it will be considered with
the other evidence."
The court relied on the definition of "clear value" as stated in Moffet
Estate14 in which clear value was held to be the consideration of one
or more of the following elements at death: 1.) market value; 2) book
value; 3) net earnings; 4) dividends, financial policy, etc., of the cor-
poration issuing the inherited stock. The court failed, however, to
point out just which of these elements were used by the state's apprai-
sers. In an earlier decision, In Re Dallone's Estate,'5 the court held
that the court on sufficient evidence could properly accept the book
value as the proper value for tax purposes notwithstanding decedent's
agreement binding on his heirs not to sell without first offering to the
optionee at a price lower than the book value. Pennsylvania has an in-
heritance tax on what is received by heirs, legatees, and distributees.' 6
Thus, in Pennsylvania, a state which has an inheritance tax as dis-
tinguished from an estate tax, and where the so-called Pennsylvania
rule origniated, the courts hold that an option or mutual buy and sell
to purchase the shares at a price which the courts considered reasonable
when the agreement was made. In spite of the increased value of the stock
at the time of the father's death, the court held the option price controlling.
Heavy reliance however, was placed on the obvious hostility between the
father and the son by the court in making their decision.
32347 Pa. 481, 32 A.2d 885 (1943). It should be noted that three years before
this case laid down the Pennsylvania rule, the MNassachusetts court in Com-
missioner v. Worcester County Trust Co., supra note 4, implied that Massa-
chusetts wouldn't apply the federal rule even if a more binding agreement
than a restrictive sales agreement came before it. Since then, the Pennsyl-
vania rule was applied in a 1951 tax board decision of Nichols v. Commis-
sioner, cited in CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Reports 17,469 (1952).
13 CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Reports 18,579 (1957).
14 369 Pa. 159, 85A. 2d 109 (1953).
15 347 Pa. 486, 32A. 2d 888 (1943).
16 PRDON'S PENNA. STATUTES ANNO., Title 72, 2301 (c) p. 19.
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agreement for the transfer of stock to take effect after death does
not establish the taxable value of the stock for inheritance tax purpoes,
but such an option or mutual buy and sell agreement will be considered
along with other evidence in the determination of the clear value of
the stock at the date of death of the transferor.
IV. OTHER STATES HAVING AN INHERITANCE TAX
The New Jersey Supreme Court followed the Pennsylvania rule
in Schroeder v. Zink,' where the option price was a fixed sum. In
that decision, the decedent bound himself to sell and a corporation (of
which decedent was the principle stockholder) bound itself to purchase
250 shares of decedent's stock at $100 per share. At time of death,
the shares had a market value of $420. The Transfer Inheritance Tax
Bureau levied an inheritance tax against the beneficiaries of the de-
cedent's will on the $100 per share received by the estate and also
levied against the contracting corporation on the $320 difference be-
tween the market value and the contract price. The court affirmed the
McClure case, stating that the option was at most, a factor to be taken
into consideration in determining fair market value, but not axiomati-
cally fix such value. The court went on to explain the tax imposed on
the contracting corporation by stating:
"The transfer thus becomes an effectual substitute for a
testamentary disposition in that there was a succession after
death without adequate consideration. If the excess value goes
untaxed, the corporation will have succeeded to it without the
burden ordinarily imposed upon the right to such succession.
Certainly the bargain made ten years before could not defeat
the statutory policy."
The New Jersey courts, however, are not in complete accordance
with the Pennsylvania rule since they make a distinction between an
option with a fixd price and an option where the price is to be fixed
by determining the value on the date of death in accordance with a
proper formula, mutually agreed upon. The terms of the option for-
mula agreement will control if the formula is reasonable.1 s
The Supreme Court of Washington, li Re Cowles' Estate,1 9 dis-
cussed and favored the Pennsylvania rule while pointing up the fact
that Washington has an inheritance tax and decisions which were cited
as following the federal rule, were all decisions of states levying an
estate tax. It should be noted, however, that the court's opinion on the
acceptance of the Pennsylvania rule in this case was dicta since the
court itself pointed out that even if the State of Washington followed
the Federal rule it could not be applied in this decision since the par-
17 4 N.J. 1, 77A. 2d 122 (1950).Is Grell v. Keyys, 132 N.J.L. 450, 41 A2d 122 (1945).
19 Supra, note 1.
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ties to the intra family contract were not dealing at arms length. The
court did not fix a price but merely rejected the appelant's contention
that restrictive stock agreements were necessarily controlling. The
court summarized its opinion as to the effect of stock option agree-
ments by stating:
"It may be that, in some situations the option price fixed in
an agreement restricting the sale of stock should establish the
market value for tax purposes; the better view would seem to
be that the whole matter lies in the realm of fact and is best as-
certained upon all the evidence."
Wisconsin, in Estate of Banta,20 its first clear cut decision on
whether a mutual buy and sell agreement f6r the transfer of stock
to take effect after the death of the transferor is binding upon inheri-
tance tax valuation, adopted a rule very similar to the Pennsylvania
rule. In the Banta decision, a mother entered into a mutual buy and
sell contract with her son in 1928, in which she contracted to transfer
3,101 shares of stock in the family owned corporation along with any
shares she might inherit from her husband, and her son contracted
to buy said stock within one year from her death at $15 per share
(the 1928 market value). The son in turn, made a similar contract in
1928 with an officer of the firm to sell said officer a sufficient amount
of decedent's shares at her death to the extent of bringing the officer's
total shares to a stipulated amount.21 The price per share in this second
contract was also $15 per share. The fair market value of the stock
on the date of the mother's death was $275 per share.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the stocks were taxable
on the $275 fair market valuation and not on the $15 contract price
although the federal authorities accepted the contract price as the vahl-
ation for the federal estate tax. In holding that the transfer was made
without adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
and therefore came within the Wisconsin inheritance tax statute,22 the
court made it emphatic that parties to such a contract may not bind
the state in their own stipulation of value of property when such
transfers are intended to come into possession and enjoyment by the
transferee at or after the death of the grantor, vendor, or donor since
the Legislature intended that the sufficiency of the consideration of
such transfers is to be determined as of the time for the transfer of
the property in possession and enjoyment, i.e., the date of death of the
20273 Wis. 328, 77 N.W. 2d 730 (1956).
21 On June 22, 1928, the decedent's son contracted with an officer who also was
a stockholder of the firm to sell said officer enough shares from which the
son might receive in the performance of the contract with his mother to
bring the officer's holdings up to 2,500 shares at the date of the mother's
death. At said date, the official had 2,188 shares and therefore the son sold
him 312 shares of the 3,151 inherited by him on August 23, 1951.2 2 WIs. STATS. §72.01 (3) (b) (1955).
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transferor. The Court made it clear that Wisconsin does not consider
the fact that federal authorities used the contract price of $15 in the
United States inheritance tax proceeding as a guide to interpretation of
the Wisconsin inheritance liability because the federal government taxes
the estate of the decedent as a whole and therefore, by Mrs. Banta's
contract, the stock was worth no more to her estate than $15 per
share. The Court pointed out that Wisconsin was not concerned with
the total estate but taxes the property interest which passes to an indi-
vidual upon the former owner's death. It should be noted that the
Court made no mention of the close family relationship present here, as
a ground for the refusal of the contract price as binding upon the
valuation of the stock for inheritance tax purposes. It can be presumed
from the fact that the federal government held that the contract was
binding upon valuation for estate tax purposes, that they found the
transaction to be bona fide and at arm's length.
Thus, Wisconsin seems to have a strict rule in regard to mutual
buy and sell agreements for the transfer of stock to take effect at or
after death, in that unlike the Pennsylvania rule, the Wisconsin Court
did not mention that the agreement would even be considered along
with other evidence in the determination of the inheritance tax valua-
tion of stock; the Court on the other hand, was rather unhesitant in
declaring that the fair market value at the time of the transferor's
death would govern in fixing the state inheritance tax upon the shares.
The strictness of the Wisconsin rule seems to be emphasized by the
Court's ruling in this decision that the son's contract to immediately
resell a quantity of the inherited stock to a third person was not mater-
ial to affect the value of these particular shares in regard to the son's
interest in the estate. It would seem that such a contract would limit
the value of the stock to the contract price since that would be the ac-
tual value of the stocks in the hands of the transferee. But if the
courts were to recognize such transferee-third party contracts, it
would open a big loophole, in that while the original transferor-trans-
feree contract would not bind the state, the transferee, by entering into
a second transfer contract with a third person could effectively limit
the estate's valuation. The Court's reasoning seems to be that an in-
heritance tax is not based on the actual value of the stocks in the hands
of the transferee but rather on the fair market value of the interest
to which the transferee succeeds at the date of the transferor's death,
and if the transferee was imprudent enough to contract such value
away for less before such date, it is of no concern of the state.
From the strong and unambiguous language of the court in the
Banta decision that the Legislature intended sufficiency of consideration
is to be determined at the death of the transferor, and that such suf-
ficiency of consideration is the fair market value, coupled with the
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particular wording of the WISCONSIN STATUTE, Sec. 72.01 (3) (b) that
the consideration must be in "money or money's worth, ' 23 it seems
very improbable that Wisconsin would have accepted the mutual buy
and sell agreement in the Banta decision as binding even if the agree-
ment price had been reasonably close to the fair market value at the
date of transferor's death or if the agreement had contained a formula
determining value, at the transferor's death, of the transfered stocks.
Although no case on point has arisen, the Attorney General of
North Carolina in 1940 indicated that the state inheritance tax rule
need not be concerned with such stock options and restrictions.24
V. STATES HAVING AN ESTATE TAx
The New York court in Aatter of iM/iller,25 in holding a binding
stock option agreement should be controlling as to tax value stated:
The Federal Estate tax law in this respect is similar to the
estate law of this state, and the above federal decisions [Wilson
and Lomb] are accepted as good authority in this case."
A more recent New York decision 26 carries the federal rule even fur-
ther than the Federal Government's interpretations27 when the New
York court, in interpretating its estate tax, held that an option to buy all
of the stock owned by a party first dying, at date of death, although the
grantor of the option could alienate the shares during his lifetime with
no restrictions, was binding upon the estate valuation. The court also
held that although the option price under the contract was considerably
less than the actual value of the shares at the date of death:
".... inadequacy of the consideration does not destroy the obli-
gation of the contract."
The New York Courts assume that states having an estate tax as
distinguished from an inheritance tax will automatically apply the
Federal rule. It is well worth noting however, that the New York
Court in Matter of Fieux2 s in 1925 applied the Federal rule before the
23 28 Ami. Ju1L, INHERITANCE, ESTATE & GIFT TAXEs §184. "Some statutes require
that in order to avoid the tax (inheritance), the consideration shall be equal
in money or Money's worth, to the full value of the property transferred."
24 North Carolina Attorney General's Opinion, Feb. 19, 1940, CCH Inh., Est. &
Gift Tax Reports (1940) 8563.
25 191 Misc. 784, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 372. A contract between three holders of all the
corporate stock provided for the sale of the holder first dying to the remain-
ing holders for a designated sum. Held: The contract was not to defraud the
state or the federal government in respect to estate taxes but to establish a
market value for the mutual protection to the stockholders and therefore the
estate tax should be determined on the basis of value of the stock as provided
in the contract.
26 In Re Galewitz, Estate, 206 Misc. 218, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 297 (1954).
27 Supra, note 3.
28241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.E. 857 (1925). Case involved a stockholder's agreement
not to dispose of any of stockholder's stock, but to hold it intact for the ben-
efit of other stockholders and to sell it at par to them at their election on
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national courts did and when New York had an inheritance tax instead
of its present estate tax. This decision has been very often cited un-
successfully by proponents of the Federal rule in inheritance tax jur-
isdictions.
Mississippi follows the federal rule in its leading case of Strange
et al v. State Tax Commissioner2 9 but like New York, the state has
an estate tax which in substance is the same as the federal tax.30
There has not been much litigation as to whether stock options or
mutual buy and sell agreements are binding upon estate evaluations in
the states which have an estate tax. This lack of litigation stems from
the fact that such states follow the federal decisions as law. A typical
example of this is in Maryland, where in 1950, although no case on
point had arisen, the attorney general of that state voiced his opinion
that an option price of a partner's survivorship agreement was con-
trolling for death tax purposes.31 Maryland now has an amendment
which expressly applies the regulations promulgated by the federal
estate tax to the estate tax situations arising in Maryland.
32
VI. CONCLUSION
A thorough study of existing decisions tends to show that the con-
flicting solutions arrived at by the courts in their attempt to solve the
problem of whether an option or a mutual buy and sell agreement for
the transfer of stock to take effect after death should establish the
value of the stock for death tax purposes, are due to the type of tax be-
ing levied. If an estate tax on the value of the property to decedent's
estate is levied, an option or a mutual buy and sell agreement, if rea-
sonable and entered into as part of an arms length transaction, will
control the valuation of the stock for estate tax purposes. If the tax is an
inheritance tax levied on the value of the stock passing to the optionee,
the option or mutual buy and sell agreement price will not bind the
estate.
There is a slight conflict among the states which employ an inher-
itance tax as to whether a stock option agreement or a mutual buy
and sell agreement should be completely ignored or whether it should
be a consideration, in determining the value of the stock for inheri-
tance tax purposes. It is the author's opinion that the wording of the
his death or leaving of the corporation. Held: Not a taxable transfer since
the agreement was irrevocably binding upon the stockholder.
29 192 Miss. 765, 7 So. 2d 542. Surviving brother exercised option to take certain
stock by paying $10,000 to deceased brother's estate as authorized by a con-
tract which the brothers had executed. Held: Value of the stock to decedent's
estate for death tax purposes was the sales price in the contract, and not the
greater book value of the stock at the time the option was exercised.
30 Miss CODF (1942 Anno.), Vol. 7, §9266d, p. 127.
31 Opinion Attorney General of Maryland, cited in CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax
Reports 17,186 (1950).
32 LAWS OF MARYLAND, Chap. 102, 159, p. 274 (1956).
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statute itself will determine the answer. If the statute is the same as
the Wisconsin statute33 and requires "adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth," then fair market value at the time of the
transferor's death will govern the fixing the value of the stock for
inheritance tax purposes. If the state has a statute similar to the
Pennsylvania statute34 requiring an adequate valuable consideration,
then a stock option agreement or a contract to purchase stock at or
after death of the transferor would be a consideration in the evaluation
of the stock for inheritance tax purposes.
The strict view which Wisconsin takes eliminates the stock option
or mutual buy and sell agreement as having any effect on the
valuation of the stock for tax purposes. The Pennsylvania rule leaves
the optionee uncertain at the time of contracting as to what the final
evaluation will be upon the death of the optioner, but it does present
the possibility that the appraiser will consider the option or mutual buy
and sell agreement and that such consideration will result in an evalu-
ation that is lower than the fair market value.
The federal rule, on the other hand, allows an individual who
proves good faith and an arms length transaction to limit the value
of the stock for estate tax purposes to a certain designated sum,
which might be considerably less than the fair market value at the
time of the transferor's death and resulting in a tax saving to the op-
tionee.
ERWIN J. KEUP
3 Supra, note 22.
U4 Supra, note 16.
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